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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN: THE CASE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY
CECILIA MARTINEZ*
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) issued the
Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) in August 2015, and is the first major federal
regulation to address climate change.1 The CPP is a landmark rule, set-
ting carbon dioxide (“CO2”) standards on existing power plants in the
U.S.2 The promise of the CPP is to reduce CO2 by 32% from 2005 levels in
2030.3 This reduction, EPA calculates, will result in combined climate and
health benefits of $34 to $54 billion in 2030 (based on a 3% discount rate).4
On the other hand, the health and economic costs associated with
climate change impacts continues to mount. Globally, the insurance group
at Munich Re estimates that worldwide weather-related losses and dam-
ages have increased from an annual average of about $50 billion in the
1980s to close to $200 billion over the last decade.5 According to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), weather-
related crop and property damages in the U.S. totaled $4.9 billion in
* Dr. Cecilia Martinez is the co-founder and Director of Research Programs at the Center
for Earth, Energy and Democracy (“CEED”). Her research is focused on the development
of energy and environmental strategies that promote equitable and sustainable policies.
Dr. Martinez has also worked with a range of organizations from local grassroots groups
to international organizations engaging in the promotion of sound environmental policy
and environmental justice. She received her B.A. from Stanford University and her Ph.D.
from the University of Delaware’s College of Urban Affairs and Public Policy.
1 Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan
/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants [https://perma.cc/YE7J-HABL] (last visited Apr. 4,
2017).
2 The Clean Power Plan applies to fossil fuel–fired electric steam generating units and
natural gas fired combined cycle generating units capable of selling greater than 25 MW
to a utility distribution system, and that commenced construction as of January 8, 2014.
3 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,665 (Oct. 23, 2015).
4 Rate based approaches are estimated at $34 to $54 billion in 2030; mass-based approach
is estimated at $32 to $48 billion in 2030. These figures do not include costs associated
with compliance. Id. at 64,679.
5 Weather-Related Loss & Damage Rising as Climate Warms, WORLD BANK (Nov. 18,
2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/11/18/disaster-climate-resilience
-in-a-changing-world [https://perma.cc/B9PQ-QJKP].
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2015.6 These calculations refer only to weather-related disasters, which
constitute just a partial set of climate-related health and economic costs.7
From a purely economic standpoint, it is clear why general support for
climate policy and continues to increase.8
In spite of the projected health and economic threats to communi-
ties and the environment that are on the horizon, the CPP has drawn
considerable controversy and criticism since its release. In their legal
battle against the EPA, numerous states9 and a range of energy and
business interests argue that key components of the CPP represent an
overreach of the agency’s authority under the Clean Air Act.10 On the
other side, the CPP’s firmest supporters are mainstream environmental-
ists and others who support carbon reduction, in many cases to the ex-
clusion of other social concerns.11 It is this latter qualification that gives
rise to the complexities of the CPP with respect to environmental justice.
The purpose of this Paper is to provide an outline of environmental
justice (“EJ”) issues of the CPP, specifically with respect to energy effi-
ciency. It was originally written as one of a complement of papers sponsored
by the Milano School of International Sustainability at the New School to
provide an EJ review of the CPP as a foundation for understanding the
opportunities and challenges for integrating equity and justice in climate
policy. The catalyst for this set of papers exemplifies one of the problem-
atic issues of climate policy in the U.S. as it has developed over the last
several years. While various policy mechanisms have been extensively
6 2015 Summary of Hazardous Weather Fatalities, Injuries, and Damage Costs by State,
NOAA (May 13, 2016), http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats/state15.pdf [https://perma
.cc/G82W-ZT7R].
7 See generally Deepa Singh, The economic costs of environmental health impacts, NAT’L
INST. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH SCIS. (Jul. 2014), https://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsletter
/2014/7/science-economic/file/721396_alt.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4KQ-SVA2].
8 According to the Pew Research Center, support for limiting greenhouse gas emissions
is divided across partisan lines: 82% of Democrats; 72% of Independents and 5% of Re-
publicans favor GHG limits. See U.S. Has Stark Partisan Differences on Climate Change,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/05/global-concern
-about-climate-change-broad-support-for-limiting-emissions/climate-change-report-27/
[https://perma.cc/JH6C-B8LS].
9 See Petition for Review, State of West Virginia et al., v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23,
2015). Plaintiffs include the following states: West Virginia, Texas, Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Michigan, Montana, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Wisconsin, Utah, Wyoming, North Carolina, Nevada, Nebraska.
10 Id. at 2.
11 See List of Supporters of the Clean Power Plan in Court, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, https://
www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/list_of_supporters_of_the_clean_power_plan_in
_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WX9-7NNY].
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analyzed in terms of economic efficiency, flexibility and costs of compli-
ance, these stand in stark contrast to only a handful of research efforts
that focus on equity impacts of domestic climate mitigation policy. Our
goal here is to provide a summary of the major justice/equity issues associ-
ated with the CPP specifically, and mainstream climate and energy policy
generally. As such, it is not intended to be an in-depth analysis, but rather
a starting point for further policy research, which we hope to continue.
I. WHY IS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STILL AN ENIGMA TO THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT?
Mainstream environmental and other advocates for climate policy
and a clean energy transition are frequently mystified by EJ positions on
climate policy, and the CPP is no different. This is because EJ advocates
continue to raise concerns, and in some cases, opposition, to some elements
of climate mitigation policies and regulations that present real and poten-
tial negative impacts on EJ communities. These EJ concerns are not new.
The EJ community has consistently and persistently raised their issues
to the mainstream environmental movement and to policy makers. Even
as climate and energy federal legislation was being developed and proposed,
most notably the Lieberman-Warner (Climate Security Act 2007 and 2008)
and Waxman-Markey bills (American Clean Energy and Securities Act of
2009), environmental justice advocates called for a need to address the
equity and justice implications of these legislative proposals.12 Yet, despite
their efforts, EJ perspectives and concerns continue to be relegated to a
marginalized position in climate and energy policy development, usually
as issues to be considered de facto.13 Essentially equity and justice enter
into consideration only after the policy or regulation is developed and im-
plemented. Even then, most equity analyses are predominantly focused
almost exclusively on rate-impact analyses that assess whether low- and
moderate-income ratepayers experience an increase or decrease in their
energy bills because of the policy.14 Rate impact analyses, from an EJ per-
spective, constitute a narrow scoping of environmental justice and equity,
and therefore while important, are inadequate for evaluating the full
scope of environmental justice in climate and energy policy.
12 See Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL.
L. REV. 1143, 1143–46 (2009).
13 See id. at 1157–58.
14 See generally For Minorities, Obama’s Carbon Plan is Justice Denied, AM. ENERGY ALL.
(Aug. 21, 2015), http://americanenergyalliance.org/2015/08/21/for-minorities-obamas
-clean-power-plan-is-justice-denied/ [https://perma.cc/3UFA-XCK8].
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This Paper focuses on identifying salient points of EJ concern in
the CPP, specifically the energy efficiency component, and to articulate
why they are of concern so that future policies and programs can be more
effective in addressing the needs of all communities. The reasons for this
marginalization is beyond the scope of this Paper, but should be ad-
dressed in other climate policy development and analyses.
II. THE TWO JUSTICE CATEGORIES AND THE CPP: SUBSTANTIVE
AND PROCEDURAL
There are two overlapping but distinct areas of environmental jus-
tice that are often conflated in the advocacy and policy world: procedural
justice and distributive justice. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of
decision-making. Procedural justice is “based on a democratic fundament
in which all affected people have the possibility to be informed, express
their opinions and influence decisions.”15 In the case of the CPP, proce-
dural environmental justice issues can be summarized as the following:
• The process of meaningful and involved consulta-
tion in the development of the proposed rule;
• What was the level of engagement with envi-
ronmental justice organizations, groups and
communities? How does this level of engage-
ment compare to other “stakeholders” (i.e.,
utilities, mainstream environmental organi-
zations, etc.).
• The process of meaningful and involved consultation
and engagement required in State Implementation
Plans (“SIPs”) in the final rule;
• What is the level of engagement with envi-
ronmental justice organizations, groups and
communities? How does this level of engage-
ment compare to other “stakeholders” (i.e.,
utilities, mainstream environmental orga-
nizations, business interests, etc.).
• The process of meaningful consultation and en-
gagement in the development of the voluntary Clean
Energy Incentive Program (“CEIP”);
15 Hanne Svarstad et al., Three types of environmental justice: From concepts to empirical
studies of social impacts of policy instruments for conservation of biodiversity, POLICYMIX
at 9 (2011).
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• Implementation of internal EPA and state-level
processes for addressing environmental justice con-
cerns in rulemaking which includes environmental
justice analyses of alternative rule options.16
Essentially, procedural justice is the stakeholder and community engage-
ment requirements for the CPP.
Distributive justice on the other hand refers to the distribution of
benefits and burdens that result from policy or regulatory implementa-
tion.17 Ideally, an equity impact analysis assesses the costs and benefits
across populations and communities due to the implementation of the
rule. Absent such an equity analysis there is virtually no information or
data that assesses the distributional impacts of the CPP as a regulatory
action. The EPA deferred action on any equity impact assessments, and
instead encouraged states to conduct such analyses in the development
and implementation of their State Implementation Plans (SIPs).18 The
result is that at this time, there is no national-scale analysis of the dis-
tributive impacts of the CPP. It is understandable that adding an equity
analysis adds complexity to the rulemaking process. However, the fact that
such analyses are yet to be conducted demonstrates the marginalized
position of environmental justice. In its Technical Guidance for Assessing
Environmental Justice in Regulatory analysis (released in June, 2016),
the EPA states that rulemakers should address these three questions:
(1) Are there potential EJ concerns associated with en-
vironmental stressors affected by the regulatory
action for population groups of concern in the base-
line?
(2) Are there potential EJ concerns associated with
environmental stressors affected by the regulatory
action or population groups of concern for the regu-
latory option(s) under consideration?
(3) For the regulatory option(s) under consideration,
are potential EJ concerns created or mitigated
compared to the baseline?19
16 See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 65,120 (Oct. 23, 2015).
17 Svarstad et al., supra note 15, at 7.
18 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,678.
19 EPA, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN REGULATORY
ANALYSIS (2016).
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A sample of the analytic questions (drawing from EPA’s guidelines for
economic analysis) that form an equity impact analysis are20:
• Identify and define the personal and demographic
characteristics (e.g., race, age) of concern. In this
step, all expected distributional effects should be
identified and prioritized.
• Measure distributional impacts using a range of
assumptions to characterize the possible distribu-
tions of expected impacts.
• What is the baseline distribution of health
and environmental outcomes across EJ com-
munities (population groups of concern) for
pollutants affected by the CPP? That is, to
what extent, what is the best assessment of
any differences across populations that ex-
ist without the rule, i.e., the CPP.
• What is the distribution of health and envi-
ronmental outcomes for the options under
consideration for the CPP? That is, what are
the differences in health and environmental
outcomes for EJ communities in comparison
to non-EJ communities as a result of the
different rule options?
• Under the options being considered, how
do the health and environmental outcomes
change for population groups of concern?
That is, how do different rule options affect
or change the health and environmental
outcomes for EJ communities (populations
of concern)?
• Determine whether distributional impacts exist
within the scope of the analysis.
• Examine distributional impacts over time because
some impacts may be a direct result of markets ad-
justing to regulatory requirements and may change
20 See, e.g., U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses, NAT’L
CENTER FOR ENVT’L ECON. (2014), https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/cf39f0d6770
458fc8525769a006aba5a/0368dfba3b1f3d9f852578df004abf89/$FILE/EE-0568-50.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GWL-QPV3].
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over time. An equity analysis is beyond the scope
of this Paper. However, in outlining the problem
associated with energy efficiency programs as cur-
rently implemented, the hope is that this will be
the subject of future research. The next section
outlines the role of energy efficiency in the CPP.
III. ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE CLEAN POWER PLAN
In contrast to the proposed rule released in 2014, in the final rule
energy efficiency was not used in EPA calculations to determine the
performance standards of Electric Generating Units (“EGUs”).21 Energy
efficiency, however, can still be used to attain state compliance. It is one
of a suite of mechanisms (including renewable energy, shifting to natural
gas, and potentially any zero-carbon emitting electricity generation) iden-
tified in the CPP as a viable option for states to meet their emissions
targets.22 In essence, any measure that reduces electricity use or reduces
carbon-based electricity generation is a legitimate candidate for compli-
ance.23 In its signature effort to provide maximum flexibility, the EPA
allows states to utilize energy efficiency in compliance in a number of
ways. If states select a mass-based plan (total metric tons of CO2), energy
efficiency activities will effectively reduce the demand for energy gener-
ated by fossil fuels, and will therefore result in a reduction in their total
CO2 emissions.
24 Under this approach, power plants must obtain allow-
ances, which are essentially permits to emit CO2 (one allowance equals
one metric ton of CO2 emissions) and these allowances can be traded in
a carbon market.25 If states adopt a rate-based approach (pounds of CO2
per MWh of generated electricity), energy efficiency (the amount of fossil-
fuel energy saved) can count as zero-carbon generated electricity, and
therefore help states meet their emissions target rate by reducing the
amount of CO2 per MWh of electricity generated in the state.26 In the
rate-based approach, each ‘quantifiable and verifiable’ MWh of energy
saved is eligible for an emission rate credit (“ERC”).27 States can either
21 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,673.
22 Id. at 64,699.
23 Id. at 64,667.
24 Id. at 64,664.
25 Id. at 64,667.
26 Id. at 64,670.
27 EPA, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN REGULATORY
ANALYSIS (2016).
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apply ERCs to their annual emission rate, and/or ERCs can be traded
such that an ERC generated in one state (if traded) may be applied to
another state’s CO2 emission rate.28
In another component of the CPP, EPA offers the states an op-
portunity to voluntarily enlist in the Clean Energy Incentive Program
(“CEIP”), which incentivizes both energy efficiency and renewable energy
for CO2 reductions before the compliance period is set to begin.29 This
early launch program is in partnership with the Department of Energy
(“DOE”) and includes a specific incentive for energy efficiency and solar
implemented in low-income communities.30 EPA outlined the major ele-
ments of the CEIP in the CPP and the specific rule was released for
comment on June 16, 2016.31
It should be noted that the CEIP, a voluntary two-year program,
is the only component that explicitly addresses equity or justice consider-
ations in the CPP.32 Even so, the CEIP presents two shortcomings from
an EJ perspective: 1) only a part of the programmatic elements of the
CEIP focus on addressing EJ community needs; and 2) energy efficiency
and solar incentives are targeted to low-income communities, but the
CEIP is mute on the needs and concerns of Native communities and
communities of color. In other words, the CEIP offers an income-based
incentive, but does not address disparities based on race. Moreover, there
is no requirement that low-income communities be a part of a state’s
participation in the CEIP. States can select to implement renewable
energy and energy efficiency projects in non-low-income communities as
a strategy in compliance, the only consequence is the incentive is lowered
in that they would receive a one-to-one match of tradable carbon units,
rather than the two-to-one match.33
The intent of the CEIP as outlined in the CPP is to encourage
states to engage in early actions that reduce emissions by implementing
energy efficiency and renewable energy projects before the formal compli-
ance period begins.34 If states choose to participate in the program, they
28 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64839.
29 Id. at 64,670.
30 Id.
31 EPA, EPA PROPOSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE CLEAN ENERGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM
(June 16, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-additional-details-clean
-energy-incentive-program [https://perma.cc/2D63-983C].
32 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. At 64,839.
33 Id. at 64,830.
34 Id. at 64,669.
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can count emissions reductions toward their state target.35 EPA incen-
tivizes this early action by providing matching allowances (if states use
a mass-based approach) or ERCs (if states use a rate-based approach) for
CO2 reductions achieved through the program up to a program maxi-
mum of 300 million tons of CO2.36
This matching pool of 300 million tons, it is proposed, will be ap-
portioned pro rata among participating states based on the amount of
reductions (state targets) each state is required to achieve.37 Half the pool
is dedicated to renewable energy projects (solar, wind, geothermal, and/or
hydropower) and half the pool is dedicated to solar projects and energy
efficiency in low-income communities.38 If implemented in low-income
communities both solar and energy efficiency are incentivized with a two-
to-one match.39 EPA indicates that their “analyses do not support the
need for a reserve for low-income community projects larger than 150
million allowances/187.5 million ERCs in order to meet demand during
the CEIP period, even with the two-to-one award for such projects.”40
In the proposed CEIP, EPA refers to this as the “low-income
community reserve” and has expanded flexibility of projects to include
residences, non-profit commercial buildings, transmission and distribu-
tion projects that reduce electricity use on the customer side of the grid.41
Allowances or ERCs earned through the CEIP can then either be applied
to the state targets, or traded with other states.42 Figure 1 outlines the
energy efficiency pathway toward compliance of the different approaches
available to the states.
35 Id. at 64,675.
36 Id. at 64,670.
37 Summary of EPA’s Proposed Regulations for the Clean Energy Incentive Program (CEIP),
ENERGY EFFICIENCY FOR ALL, 6 (2016), http://www.energyefficiencyforall.org/sites/default
/files/eefa-ceip-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/97ZU-F769].
38 Id. at 2.
39 Id. at 3.
40 Id. at 2.
41 Id. at 3.
42 Clean Power Plan Implementation: What States Need to Know, NCSL (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/01/12/document_cpp_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBA2
-RVCL]. Similarly, renewable energy is incentivized with a one-to-one match, although
there is no preference to equity (low-income targets) in the renewable energy incentives
ENERGY EFFICIENCY FOR ALL, supra note 37. If a state chooses a rate-based plan, every
verified MWh of zero-carbon electricity receives 1 ERC from the state, and 1 ERC from EPA.
Clean Power Plan Implementation, NCSL. If a state chooses a mass-based plan, the project
would be eligible to receive 0.8 allowances from the state and 0.8 allowances from the EPA.
614 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:605
Figure 1. Energy Efficiency/Renewable Energy in the Clean Power
Plan (US EPA)
A. History of Energy Efficiency
In order to address EJ issues with respect to energy efficiency in
the CPP, it is necessary to understand the history and context of how
this infrastructure has developed over the last 40 years. The origins of
energy efficiency as a viable and accepted energy option can be traced
back to the 1970s when the energy crisis brought on by the oil embargoes
sent energy price shocks that reverberated throughout the economy.43
43 THOMAS C. HOERBER, THE ORIGINS OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN EUROPE:
THE BEGINNINGS OF A EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIENCE 185, 187 (Routledge 2013).
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Fuel price increases directly affected all sectors including the electricity
sector, and the dramatic need to reduce costs led to focused attention on
developing demand side management and renewable energy. Demand
side management is a term used to describe the process of managing or
reducing the demand for electricity (which includes energy efficiency).44
This was the first serious effort to provide public support for energy ef-
ficiency and renewable energy.45
Since then, the development of a variety of federal, state, and
local policies have been instrumental in building an energy efficiency and
renewable energy infrastructure. In addition, both have been the benefi-
ciaries of decades of research and development (“R&D”) investment,
which made these technologies economically cost effective.46 In the early
years between 1973 and 1977 the federal government spent about $2.5
billion (in 2013 dollars) on renewable energy, $890 million on energy
efficiency, and $180 million on electric systems R&D.47 The Department
of Energy (“DOE”) was established in 1977 and its R&D spending be-
tween 2005 and 2014 totaled $7.87 billion for renewable energy and $6.7
billion for energy efficiency, for a combined total of $14.57 billion.48 While
this is a quite substantial figure, it still represents roughly two-thirds of
DOE R&D spending for fossil fuels and nuclear power, which continue
to receive the bulk of public R&D support (See Table 1).49 Nonetheless,
the impact of both public energy efficiency and renewable energy invest-
ments has been instrumental in the development and adoption of these
technologies. It is also not surprising that energy efficiency programs
that were initially developed to meet the needs of the utility sector
during a time of substantially increasing fuel costs continue to be embed-
ded within the utility structure.50 This is important for a number of
reasons, which are highlighted in the following sections.
44 Demand Side Management, POWERWISE (2017), http://www.powerwise.gov.ae/en
/research/programmes-projects/demand-side-management.html [https://perma.cc/7UJB
-PHLX].
45 See HOERBER, supra note 43.
46 Fred Sissine, Renewable Energy R&D Funding History: A Comparison with Nuclear
Energy, Fossil Energy, and Energy Efficiency, R&D, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
at 1 (Oct. 10, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22858.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYC5
-NVF3].
47 Id. at 3.
48 Id. at 2–3.
49 Id. at 3.
50 Id. at 3.
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TABLE 1. ENERGY R&D CUMULATIVE FUNDING TOTALS, 2005–2014 
(BILLIONS OF 2013 DOLLARS)51
Electric
Systems
Nuclear
Energy
Fossil 
Energy
Energy 
Efficiency
Renewables
6.26 11.66 10 6.7 7.87
B. Energy Efficiency and Environmental Justice
Today, energy efficiency encompasses a wide range of incentives and
programs administered or delivered at the local, state, and federal levels.
Some examples include: federal and state efficiency standards for appli-
ances, state and local building energy codes, tax credits and other incentive
programs for both energy producers and energy consumers, and labeling
programs (e.g., ENERGY STAR).52 Still, despite the advancement of these
programs, issues of environmental justice have not been central to energy
efficiency planning and policy in the U.S. To the degree it is addressed,
equity research and analysis in the energy field is almost exclusively fo-
cused on ratepayer impacts of various energy supply (including efficiency)
options across income levels.53 Another method for researching the eco-
nomic impacts of energy is in the concept of energy burden. Energy
51 Id.
52 See Elizabeth Doris et al., Energy Efficiency Policy in the United States: Overview of
Trends at Different Levels of Government, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY
(Dec. 2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46532.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY7K-5QBF].
53 Tim Woolf et al., Best Practices in Energy Efficiency Program Screening: How to Ensure
that the Value of Energy Efficiency is Properly Accounted For, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON.
(July 23, 2012), http://www.nhpci.org; Understanding Cost-Effectiveness of Energy Programs:
Best Practices, Technical Methods, and Emerging Issues for Policy-Makers, NATL. ACTION
PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY (Nov. 2008), https://michigan.gov/documents/energy/cost-effec
tiveness_411711_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWN4-C2B8]. Energy burden refers to proportion
of household income that is “burdened” by the cost of energy or the share of annual household
income that is used to pay annual energy bills. Building on the concept of energy burden,
there are also concepts such as energy affordability gap, household energy insecurity, and
energy or fuel poverty. Adam Chandler, Where the Poor Spend More Than 10 Percent of
Their Income on Energy, THE ATLANTIC (June 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/busi
ness/archive/2016/06/energy-poverty-low-income-households/486197/ [https://perma.cc/2VGD
-V4Q9]. Studies that examine ratepayer impacts focus on the impact of electricity rates that
may result because of environmental regulations, and whether such changes increase the
burden on low-income households. See Seth B Shonkoff et al., Environmental Health and
Equity Impacts From Climate Change and Mitigation Policies in California: A Review of
the Literature, CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR. (Aug. 2009), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009pub
lications/CEC-500-2009-038/CEC-500-2009-038-D.PDF [https://perma.cc/TK2W-GDXF].
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burden is a way to describe and analyze changes in the proportion of
household income that is required to pay for energy costs.54 Yet, at this
time, there is no standard threshold(s) to define an affordable level of
household energy costs. Therefore, there is no national standard or defini-
tion for what constitutes an affordable proportion of household income for
energy at the household level.55 Energy burden is simply a descriptive
statistic that refers to the percentage of household income required to
pay for utility energy costs; various studies have identified anywhere
from 6% to 10% as an affordable level.56
In the absence of standardized energy affordability thresholds,
those concerned with the problem of energy cost impacts on families and
communities have begun to address the issue. Fisher, Colton and Sheehan
have developed a tool for assessing the gap between energy costs and what
is affordable based on household income levels.57 As shown in Table 2,
when aggregated to a Census Region level, six of the nine regions have
experienced an increased gap in affordability since 2011.58 The East South
Central and Pacific experienced the highest gap increases.59 In only two
regions, the Middle Atlantic and New England, is there a decrease in the
affordability gap.60
Importantly, energy burdens and lack of affordability have an im-
pact on family well-being in a number of ways. In a 2011 survey of low-
income households, the National Energy Assistance Directors Association
54 AUSTIN ENERGY , RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY BURDEN: AN INVESTIGATION OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA (2006–2008) 2 (2010), https://austinenergy.com/wps/wcm/con
nect/b63f8931-5797-4172-a041-7a115559e2cc/affordabilityStudyPresentation.pdf?MOD
=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/4ETM-A84V].
55 See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, 2011 BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK § 2.9.2 (2012), http://
buildingsdatabook.eren.doe.gov/docs/DataBooks/2011_BEDB.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5A7
-GKMV]; Governor Cuomo Announces New Energy Affordability Policy to Deliver Relief
to Nearly 2 Million Low-Income New Yorkers, NYSERDA (May 19, 2016), https://www.ny
serda.ny.gov/About/Newsroom/2016-Announcements/2016-05-19-Governor-Cuomo
-Announces-New-Energy-Affordability-Policy [https://perma.cc/V5BE-2LM9].
56 Chandler, supra note 53. For Fisher, Sheehan & Colton’s methodology for developing
the energy affordability gap, see What Is the Home Energy Affordability Gap?, FISHER
SHEEHAN AND COLTON: HOME ENERGY AFFORDABILITY GAP, http://www.homeenergyaf
fordabilitygap.com/01_whatIsHEAG2.html [https://perma.cc/CD65-PDXR] (last visited
Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Home Energy Affordability Gap].
57 Home Energy Affordability Gap, supra note 56.
58 FISHER, SHEEHAN & COLTON, THE HOME ENERGY AFFORDABILITY GAP 2015 2 (2d series
2016), http://www.homeenergyaffordabilitygap.com/downloads/2015_Released_Apr16/HE
AG2015%20Regional%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK6B-UBXJ].
59 Id.
60 Id.
618 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:605
(“NEADA”) found that in dealing with high energy costs, families resort
to several coping options that impact their well-being61:
• 24% went without food for at least one day
• 37% went without medical or dental care
• 34% did not fill a prescription or took less than the
full dose
• 19% had someone become sick because their home
was too cold
TABLE 2. ENERGY AFFORDABILITY GAP BY CENSUS REGION (2011, 2015)62
Region Home Energy
Affordability
Gap 2011
Home Energy
Affordability
Gap 2015
LIHEAP
Allocation
($000,s)
Number
of HH
<150%
FPL
Heating/
Cooling
Bills
Covered
by
LIHEAP
Home
Energy
Afford-
ability
Gap
Index
(2011
Baseline)
East
North
Central
$6,428,502,561 $6,395,164,500 $647,893 4,404,904 707,830 99.5
East
South
Central
$2,659,129,715 $3,768,338,720 $169,558 2,164,241 184,430 141.7
Middle
Atlantic
$6,935,724,277 $4,829,121,822 $706,421 3,431,741 766,194 69.6
Mountain $1,298,705,415 $1,364,899,634 $166,374 2,142,686 278,218 105.1
New
England
$2,940,690,791 $2,721,575,756 $338,628 1,055,548 241,152 92.5
Pacific $3,205,835,024 $4,182,227,526 $278,703 4,478,847 561,896 130.5
South
Atlantic
$7,992,087,977 $9,593,468,217 $444,592 5,919,031 458,723 120
West
North
Central
$2,218,897,046 $2,686,137,856 $335,616 1,825,660 366,073 121.1
West
South
Central
$4,918,069,787 $5,594,500,370 $212,220 3,841,374 239,466 113.8
The Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) also found that between 2006
and 2010, 10,649 deaths were due to weather-related causes.63 Excessive
61 NATL. ENERGY ASSISTANCE DIRS.’ ASS’N, 2011 NATIONAL ENERGY ASSISTANCE SURVEY
FINAL REPORT ii–iii (2011), http://www.appriseinc.org/reports/Final%20NEADA%202011
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3KA-D7JQ].
62 FISHER, SHEEHAN & COLTON, supra note 58.
63 J. Berko et al., Deaths Attributed to Heat, Cold, and Other Weather Events in the United
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natural heat was either the underlying cause or a contributing cause of
death for 3,332 (31%) of these deaths; exposure to excessive natural cold
or hypothermia accounted for 6,660 (63%) of deaths; and the remaining
6% were attributed to floods, storms, or lightning.64 How much of a con-
tributing factor was the lack of energy affordability or access was not a
part of the report.65 It is clear, however, that while a great deal of atten-
tion is paid to disaster-related climate change impacts on communities,
chronic exposure to heat and cold is by far a deadlier problem.66
The concepts of energy security/insecurity are also conceptual meth-
ods for addressing the impacts on families that result from compromised
access to affordable and sustainable energy services. Cook et al. define
energy security as the “consistent access to enough of the kinds of energy
needed for a healthy and safe life in the geographic area where a house-
hold is located.”67 This means that household members “are able to
obtain the energy needed to heat/cool their home and operate lighting,
refrigeration, and appliances while maintaining expenditures for other
necessities (e.g., rent, food, clothing, transportation, child care, medical
care).”68 Alternatively, energy insecurity occurs when a household “lacks
consistent access to the amount or the kind of energy needed for a
healthy and safe life for its members.”69 Hernandez et al. define energy
insecurity as the “inability to adequately meet basic household heating,
cooling, and energy needs . . . and is a pervasive and often-overlooked
problem for low-income families with children.”70 In their study, Cook et
al. found that energy insecurity is associated with “poor health status,
life-time hospitalizations, and parents’ report of developmental concerns
among infants and toddlers.”71
States, 2006–2010, 76 NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REPS. 1, 4 (2014), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs
/data/nhsr/nhsr076.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BBG-DLBC].
64 Id.
65 See id.
66 See id.; see also Lauren F. Friedman, Sunny Days Are Actually Much More Dangerous
Than Storms, BUS. INSIDER (July 20, 3014), http://www.businessinsider.com/cdc-weather
-related-deaths-2014-7 [https://perma.cc/6QZS-783P].
67 John T. Cook et al., A Brief Indicator of Household Energy Security: Associations with
Food Security, Child Health, and Child Development in US Infants and Toddlers, 122
PEDIATRICS 4 e867, e869 (2008), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics
/122/4/e867.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7U6-A3MF].
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 DIANA HERNANDEZ ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, ENERGY INSECURITY
AMONG FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 3 (2014), http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text
_1086.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TB8-U726].
71 Cook et al., supra note 67, at e874.
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Interestingly, the release of the final CPP rule has resulted in a
minor increase in interest in equity in energy planning.72 However, in
comparison to the explosion of CPP analyses that focus on nearly every
other aspect of the CPP, equity is by far the least analyzed.73 From an EJ
perspective, this is particularly troublesome. As energy efficiency and
renewable energy become the pathways to a new energy economy, the
implications for the distribution of the benefits and costs of these energy
alternatives, in terms of how they are produced and who has access, are
critical to future social and environmental sustainability. If justice and
equity are not included as goals at the onset, there is no reason to believe
that the new green economy can or will address the disparities that are
present in the present fossil fuel-based economy.
It is this context in which EJ assesses the role of energy efficiency
in climate mitigation policy. CO2 reduction is obviously the target out-
come for the energy efficiency strategy in the CPP.74 However, when CO2
is the sole measure of effectiveness, without integration of other social
and economic concerns, implementation can reinforce inequality and
unsustainability for EJ communities.
C. Structural Energy Efficiency Challenges to EJ in the CPP and
Climate Policy
The CPP and other climate-related policies suffer from a critical
lack of incorporation of EJ or equity in both their development and
implementation. In this section, several points of EJ concern are identi-
fied with brief summaries about how they potentially increase dispropor-
tionate and unequal outcomes, even as states may successfully attain
72 See, e.g. ARIEL DREHOBL & LAUREN ROSS, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT
ECON., LIFTING THE HIGH ENERGY BURDEN IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES 36–37 (2016),
http://energyefficiencyforall.org/sites/default/files/Lifting%20the%20High%20Energy%20
Burden_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMQ5-7TY6]; RACHEL CLUETT ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR
AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., BUILDING BETTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS FOR
HOUSEHOLDS 2–3, 15, 25, 31–33 (2016), http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/re
searchreports/a1601.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PFP-5XH8]; SERJ BERELSON, OPOWER, MYTHS
OF LOW-INCOME ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS in ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS 7–32 (2014), http://aceee.org/files/proceedings/2014/data/papers
/7-287.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJL2-G96G].
73 See id.
74 Peter Foster, Barack Obama Unveils Plan to Tackle Greenhouse Gases and Climate
Change, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/barackobama/11779765/Barack-Obama-to-unveil-tougher-plan-to-tackle-greenhouse
-gases-and-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/R6UW-KVSR].
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regulatory compliance. It is important to note that raising these concerns
does not in any way diminish EJ support for real and effective climate
mitigation regulations. In fact, polls show that people of color exhibit
strong concern about climate change and support climate policy and leg-
islation—this is significant because EJ objections about the architecture
of the CPP are often construed as undermining effective climate policy
and regulation.75 Yet, from an EJ perspective, it is quite the opposite—
that is, addressing EJ concerns can result in more equitable, effective, and
sustainable climate policy in the long term.
IV. CARBON REDUCTIONISM
The role of energy efficiency in the CPP is as a mechanism to
reduce carbon emissions to achieve regulatory compliance.76 Beyond the
CPP, energy efficiency will likely continue as an important and viable
option in any climate mitigation regulatory strategy. From an EJ per-
spective, the use of energy efficiency is critical to addressing climate
change; however, the institutional context in which energy efficiency is
developed and implemented, and upon which the CPP relies, is problem-
atic. In this case, efficiency is almost exclusively valued for its carbon
reduction role, irrespective of other social, environmental, and economic
factors. This results in a type of carbon reductionism, that is, the “reduc-
tion of the complex problems of climate change to the single issue of net
CO2 emissions,” and “has led to a conceptual focus on abstract carbon
that excludes consideration of its wider context.”77 The tension arises
because, as Moolna notes, there “has been such a focus on carbon that it
has become removed from its environmental and social (and even cli-
mate) context.”78
75 Coral Davenport, Climate is a Big Issue for Hispanics, and Personal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/us/politics/climate-change-is-of-growing-personal
-concern-to-us-hispanics-poll-finds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QHZ4-FPUS]; ANTHONY
LEISEROWITZ & KAREN AKERLOF, YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE & GEO. MASON CTR.
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMM., RACE, ETHNICITY AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
passim (2015); see generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS:
HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL
CAPITALISM (2010).
76 Allie Malloy & Sunlen Serfaty, Obama Unveils Major Climate Change Proposal, CNN
(Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/02/politics/obama-climate-change-plan/ [https://
perma.cc/U83N-QLA3].
77 Adam Moolna, Making Sense of CO2: Putting Carbon in Context, 12 GLOBAL ENVTL.
POL. 1, 2 (2012).
78 Id. at 1.
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In the case of energy efficiency in the CPP, carbon reductionism
manifests in several areas. First, the only equity-specific component of
the CPP is in the voluntary CEIP.79 Given this, the CPP relegates equity
to a voluntary and relatively small and finite program in the climate
mitigation rule. While it is true that verifiable and quantifiable energy
efficiency in native communities, communities of color, and low-income
communities can be used for state compliance, there is no other incentive
or requirement within the CPP to target these EJ communities or to
address other social, economic, and environmental issues.80 As will be
discussed below, this potentially reinforces inequity in that the existing
energy efficiency infrastructure as it currently operates underserves EJ
communities. The second EJ concern is that the valuation of energy
efficiency in the CPP is via carbon trading currencies (ERCs or allow-
ances). In effect, energy efficiency is valorized solely in terms of carbon
reductions, exclusive of any other social, health, economic, or distributive
criterion. This means that carbon reductions achieved through energy
efficiency are monetized through the carbon trading market, regardless
of who benefits or how these benefits are distributed in the carbon market
scheme. Moolna suggests that such actions have “been favored by politi-
cians perhaps because it replaces the irreducible complexity of global
climate dynamics with a digestible concept, and by business because it
allows the commodification essential to making climate tradable.”81
EJ concerns about carbon trading are articulated elsewhere, and
are not the specific focus of this Paper. However, it is important to men-
tion that these concerns center on the potential problem of creating pol-
lution “hot spots.” Hot spots, places that accumulate pollution-creating
NIMBY facilities, are possible because of the different costs associated
with pollution control.82 If the costs of carbon reduction are higher in
plants in EJ communities, carbon trading can lead to increased carbon
and co-pollution in these communities, as lower-cost reductions are pur-
sued elsewhere.83 The result is that in aggregate, CO2 reductions may be
an actual result, but some units may experience smaller decreases, and
perhaps increases. The different cost of carbon reductions is not randomly
79 EPA, FACT SHEET: ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 2 (2016), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-ee.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8G7
-22RW].
80 Environmental Justice in the Clean Power Plan, ENVTL. AND ENERGY STUDY INST. (Feb. 22,
2016), http://www.eesi.org/briefings/view/022216justice [https://perma.cc/7KPC-8369].
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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distributed across communities, which begs the question: will power plants
in EJ communities reduce emissions proportionately to power plants lo-
cated in non-EJ communities? The problem is that there is yet to be a
determination as to whether hot spots in EJ communities are expected
by the CPP or trading-based climate regulation generally.84 This is of
significance because while carbon is a global pollutant, the other co-
pollutants that are by-products of fossil-fuel combustion (PM, HAPs,
VOCs) have local health impacts.85 Therefore, the potential of the CPP,
through carbon trading to result in EJ hot spots is one of the major rea-
sons there was an EJ call for an equity-impact analysis of the CPP as the
rule was developed.86
Other EJ concerns include the following87:
• Low-hanging fruit bias88
• Program costs for energy efficiency implementation89
• Household versus community-oriented energy effi-
ciency implementation90
84 See Rachel Salcido, Rationing Environmental Law in a Time of Climate Change, 46
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 667 (2015); see also Nicklas Akers, New Tools for Environmental
Justice: Articulating a Net Health Effects Challenge to Emissions Trading Markets, 7
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 203, 211 (2001).
85 Don Lieber, Top 10 Toxic Ingredients Used In The Fossil Fuel Industries, PLANETSAVE
(Dec. 7, 2013), http://planetsave.com/2013/12/07/pollution-air-pollution-water-pollution
-health-problems/ [https://perma.cc/UVJ6-KJX4].
86 Letter from Harvard Law School Environmental Law Program to EPA (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Harvard-Environ
mental-Policy-Initiative-Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S5X-HS8F].
87 See, e.g. Michael Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging
Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2008); Nicolas Loris, The Many Problems of the EPA’s Clean
Power Plan and Climate Regulations: A Primer, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 27, 2015), http://
www.heritage.org/environment/report/the-many-problems-the-epas-clean-power-plan
-and-climate-regulations-primer [https://perma.cc/K9AH-H2FA]; see David Schlosberg,
Theorizing Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Discourse, 22-1 ENVTL. POL.
37, 40–42 (2013); Steven Moss et al., Securing a Gold Standard for Equity: Methods for
Crediting Residential and Small Business Reductions in Carbon Markets, ENVTL. DEF.
FUND (April 1, 2010), https://www.edf.org/sites/default /files/10958_C4C-Securing-a-Gold
-Standard-for-Equity.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UG3-NPGL]; Edan Rotenberg, Energy Efficiency
in Regulated and Unregulated Markets, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 259, 301 (2006).
88 Vandenbergh et al., supra note 87.
89 Deborah Behles, From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy in Environmental Justice Communities, 58 VILLANOVA L. REV. 25, 25 (2013).
90 Greg Wassel, Improving Energy Efficiency in Low-Income Communities, GOODCENTS,
Oct. 19, 2016, http://www.goodcents.com/blog/improving-energy-efficiency-in-low-income
-communities [https://perma.cc/QKW6-73ZF].
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• Equity programs dominated by rate-payer assis-
tance91
• Energy efficiency is independent from pollutant
reductions92
• Racial analysis unaddressed93
V. COMMUNITIES AND THE LOW-HANGING FRUIT BIAS
Over the last several years, the prevailing perspective has that
“[e]fficiency is the low-hanging fruit of the clean-energy revolution.”94 This
iconic metaphor (of low-hanging fruit) has emerged as a way of describ-
ing the promise and potential of energy efficiency in the clean energy
transition and in climate mitigation.95 The concept refers to the idea that
numerous opportunities to reduce energy consumption exist and are
ready to be exploited with low-cost, low-investment, easy-to-implement
measures, which also provide significant returns on investment.96 Energy
efficiency as the low-hanging fruit of the energy transition is important—as
President Obama has affirmed in his remarks before the signing of the
Energy Efficiency Improvement Act in 2015, “I hope that we can use this
to build even more progress in the future, because we’ve got a lot more
work to do. There’s a lot of low-hanging fruit—this is the area where we
can have the greatest environmental impact while making sure that
we’re creating good jobs and saving businesses and consumers money.”97
Vandenberg, et al. identify five criteria that form the basis of
energy efficiency as low-hanging fruit, and therefore serve as guideposts
for energy efficiency investment. These are98:
91 Behles, supra note 89, at 9.
92 Ted Gayer & Alexander Gold, Four reasons to be wary of energy-efficiency mandates,
BROOKINGS, May 1, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2015/05/01/four
-reasons-to-be-wary-of-energy-efficiency-mandates/ [https://perma.cc/Y4MP-UM2D].
93 Eric Yamamoto & Jen-L Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice, 72 COLO. L. REV.
311, 312 (2001).
94 Jeremy Oppenheim et al., Not So Sky High, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, Nov. 15, 2008,
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/in-the-news/Not-sky-high [https://perma.cc/98NA
-6PAM].
95 Vandenbergh et al., supra note 87.
96 See id.
97 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Energy Efficiency and Job Creation (Dec. 15,
2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/15/president-retrofitting-build
ings-heres-what-s-sexy-about-it-saving-money [https://perma.cc/ARB7-37B2] (emphasis
added).
98 Vandenbergh et al., supra note 87, at 1709 (emphasis added).
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• Magnitude—the emissions reductions from the ac-
tivity should be of a size that justifies expending
time and money on the measures necessary to re-
duce the emissions;
• National Economic Cost—the economic cost of the
energy efficiency measures should be equal to or
less than that of other measures;
• Out-of-Pocket Government Cost—the out-of-pocket
cost to the government should not exceed levels
that are viable in the current or reasonably fore-
seeable future political climate;
• Personal Economic Cost—the economic benefits to
individuals should equal or exceed the costs; and
• Other Personal Barriers—individuals should not face
other barriers to reducing emissions, such as initial
capital investment requirements, lack of necessary
infrastructure, substantial time demands, or coun-
tervailing personal or social norm–based pressure.
In the residential sector, low-hanging fruit is translated into an
informal designation of ‘efficiency-ready’ households, whereby energy
efficiency can be implemented at relatively low cost.99 This requires that
these homes must be able to cost-effectively accept energy efficiency
technologies and services, have the resources and capacity to share in the
cost of implementing energy efficiency measures, generate enough energy
savings to justify energy efficiency investments, and allow residents to
effectively utilize these energy efficiency technologies.
Using the above criteria, however, it is clear that energy efficiency
in low-income communities do not easily meet these low-hanging fruit
criteria, particularly when compared to their middle and upper income
counterparts.100 The result, whether intentional or unintentional, is that
by first targeting the low-hanging fruit, energy efficiency programs have
increased capital investments for middle and upper income efficiency-
ready housing and infrastructure that have lower energy efficiency
99 Michael Vandenberg, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Changing Climates: Adapt-
ing Law and Policy to a Transforming World, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703 (2008).
100 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in Low-Income Communities: A Guide to EPA
Programs, EPA (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-03/documents/epa
_low_income_program_guide_508_2-29-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VU9-MTVU] (last visited
Apr. 4, 2017).
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implementation costs, greater ability to share the costs of implementa-
tion, and aggregate savings that are sufficient to offset the costs of im-
plementing energy efficiency measures.101 Historic disinvestment in certain
communities, i.e., EJ communities, has resulted in older and capital-
challenged community infrastructures, thereby excluding them as targets
for low-hanging fruit programs.
The conditions of housing stock and infrastructure in EJ neigh-
borhoods and communities still lag behind higher income communities
due to a persistent pattern of disinvestment.102 A Robert Woods Johnson
issue brief notes that “[n]early one fifth of all Americans—about 52 million
people—live in poor neighborhoods (i.e., neighborhoods in which at least
20 percent of residents are poor).”103 Moreover, racial segregation contin-
ues to be a fact of U.S. life, even when income is taken into account.104
The “uneven pattern of neighborhood disadvantage across racial or ethnic
groups is not fully explained by differences in family income. Among fami-
lies with similar incomes, blacks and Hispanics live in neighborhoods
with higher concentrations of poverty than whites.”105 The result is that
as energy efficiency programs and investment have evolved over the last
25 years, an inherent bias toward middle and upper income residential
communities over low- and moderate-income communities has poten-
tially widened the infrastructure gap.106 The role of energy efficiency
programs in maintaining and reinforcing this biased investment pattern
should be investigated.
101 Maria Mirzatuny, Energy Management Can Empower Everyone Regardless of Income
Level, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Dec. 3, 2014), http://blogs.edf.org/texascleanairmatters/2014
/12/03/energy-management-can-empower-everyone-regardless-of-income-level/ [https://
perma.cc/8T5N-G368].
102 Miriam Zuk et al., Gentrification and the Role of Public Investment: A Literature
Review 9 (Ctr. Cmty. Dev. Inv., Working Paper No. 2015-05, 2015), http://www.frbsf.org
/community-development/publications/working-papers/2015/august/gentrification
-displacement-role-of-public-investment/ [https://perma.cc/6DD3-M6B4].
103 ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, COMMISSION TO BUILD A HEALTHIER AMERICA,
WHERE WE LIVE MATTERS FOR OUR HEALTH: NEIGHBORHOODS AND HEALTH 5 (2008),
http://www.commissiononhealth.org/PDF/888f4a18-eb90-45be-a2f8-159e84a55a4c/Issue
%20Brief%203%20Sept%2008%20-%20Neighborhoods%20and%20Health.pdf [https://perma
.cc/V3F5-G94J].
104 Rajini Vaidyanathan, Why Don’t Black and White Americans Live Together?, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35255835 [https://perma
.cc/3L22-ZTAJ].
105 ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, supra note 103, at 6.
106 Efficiency Programs for Low Income Areas, AM. CONSERVATION GROUP (Sept. 5, 2016,
5:00 AM), http://info.amconservationgroup.com/blog/efficiency-programs-low-income-areas
[http://perma.cc/PBX9-HUEF].
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VI. PROGRAM COSTS AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS FOR EQUITABLE
ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT
In order to illustrate how energy efficiency as a carbon mitigation
strategy based solely on carbon reduction and implementation cost cri-
teria poses challenges to serving EJ communities, a review of the break-
down of program costs is required. Energy efficiency programs are designed
to serve different sectors: industrial, commercial, agricultural, residential
and low-income.107 Evaluations of these programs show that low-income
programs have higher costs and constitute a small proportion of energy
savings when compared to the residential sector as a whole, and to the
commercial, industrial and agricultural sectors.108 In an assessment of
electric energy efficiency programs, Hoffman et al., found that program
administration costs for low-income programs are seven times higher
than for general residential programs.109 The reason for this is that partici-
pants in residential programs usually share the costs of energy efficiency
measures,110 whereas the capacity to share in these costs is economically
challenging for low-income families. The result is that nearly all costs for
low-income programs are absorbed by the program or project.111 As
Hoffman et al. notes, the “cost contribution from participating low-income
customers tends to be modest in these programs ([approximately 10%] of
project cost), with program administrators most often paying the full cost
of comprehensive retrofits of older, lower-quality housing, in which basic
repairs may be a prerequisite for efficiency improvements.”112
Table 3 shows that the total cost of saved electricity for low-
income energy programs is approximately 14.2 cents per kWh, compared
to only 3.3 cents per kWh for the residential sector.113 Low-income pro-
grams have over four times the program costs.114 One reason for this is
that there is significant variability in the quality of existing housing
107 Ian Hoffman et al., ELECTRICITY MARKETS & POLICY GROUP, CUSTOMER-FUNDED
ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS: ESTIMATES AT THE NATIONAL, STATE, SECTOR AND PRO-
GRAM LEVEL 2 (2015), https://eetd.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/total-cost-of-saved-energy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XH7U-27J4].
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 For example, efficient appliance programs provide rebates, but the cost of purchasing
the new appliance is borne by the customer. Low-interest loans similarly subsidize efficiency,
but the customer is responsible for a significant portion of the capital needed for purchases.
111 Hoffman et al., supra note 107, at 12.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2.
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stock.115 Not all housing is efficiency-ready, that is, in a condition that read-
ily matches the services offered by energy efficiency programs.116 In their
study, Cluett et al., explain that low-income energy efficiency programs
commonly find some type of health, safety, moisture, dura-
bility, and/or structural issue that requires repair before
energy efficiency improvements can be made . . . and are
a challenge for implementing low-income weatherization
services. While major issues can render households ineligi-
ble for weatherization altogether, more-minor [sic] issues
can add up to make the cost of energy efficiency improve-
ments too high to meet cost-benefit tests.117
In addition to the overall higher costs of energy efficiency mea-
sures for low-income communities, there is the problem of who pays for
these measures. The share of the cost of low-income energy efficiency
delivery programs are almost entirely borne by the program itself; 13.4
cents per kWh and less than 1 cent per kWh is paid by the resident
customers.118 In the residential sector, the share of energy efficiency
measures is almost evenly distributed between the program administra-
tor and the residential customer, 1.9 cents per kWh and 1.4 cents per
kWh respectively.119 Overall, the program administration cost of energy
efficiency measures in the residential sector are 1.9 cents per kWh com-
pared to 13.4 cents per kWh for low-income programs.120 The CPP’s two-
to-one match of ERCs and allowances through the CEIP are inadequate
to address the program cost barriers for low-income energy efficiency
programs. In fact, given that program administration costs are seven times
greater than residential programs, the CEIP incentive is likely insuffi-
cient to effectively incentivize energy efficiency in low-income communi-
ties unless the health and environmental co-benefits of energy efficiency
are also included.121 Yet, as noted above, energy efficiency in the CPP and
CEIP only include carbon reductions in their accounting for incentives
and compliance.122
115 Id.
116 Id. at 18.
117 CLUETT ET AL., supra note 72, at 13–14.
118 Hoffman et al., supra note 107, at 2.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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TABLE 3. SAVINGS-WEIGHTED AVERAGE TOTAL COST OF SAVED ELECTRICITY
BY SECTOR123
Sector Total Cost of
Saved Electricity
(2012 $/kWh)*
Program Admin-
istrator Cost of
Saved
Electricity
(2012 $/kWh)
Participant
Cost of Saved
Electricity
(2012 $/kWh)
All Sectors $0.046 $0.023 $0.022
Residential $0.033 $0.019 $0.014
Commercial, 
Industrial and
Agricultural
$0.055 $0.025 $0.030
Low Income $0.142 $0.134 $0.008
* Totals differ due to rounding; based on 2009–2013 data.
Another bias element in energy efficiency, as it is currently im-
plemented, is the problem of qualitative distinctions in energy consump-
tion. From a purely carbon and energy reduction standpoint all energy
consumption is the same, regardless of its end use.124 Unlike in the in-
ternational climate agenda where basic energy needs are understood to
be a priority and a human right, there has been little to no attention to
different energy needs in our domestic agenda.125 Any distinction be-
tween energy used for luxury amenities versus basic living needs is
nonexistent.126 Yet, this has important equity and justice implications.
As Schaffrin and Reibling note, “high-income households use more energy
[than low-income households] because they can afford a more resourceful
lifestyle” which includes among other factors, larger dwellings and a
higher number of appliances and energy using amenities.127 Put simply,
123 Id.
124 See Hoffman et al., supra note 107, at 2–3 (distinguishing “the total cost of saved
energy,” which “is not directly affected by differences in energy prices or other benefits
across markets and utility territories,” from the “Program Administrator Cost Test,”
“Total Resource Cost Test,” and “Societal Cost Test,” all of which “are the primary screening
tools for comparing the costs and benefits of energy efficiency programs and often decisions
about whether utility customers should fund a program”); see also Julie Blackwell, DSM
Utility and Societal Cost Tests, MICHAELSENERGY.COM (2015), http://michaelsenergy.com
/briefs/dsm-utility-and-societal-cost-tests/ [https://perma.cc/S3ET-TE7L] (contrasting the
“Utility Cost Test”/“Administrator Cost Test” with the “Societal Cost Test”).
125 Joss Tantram, From the stars . . . post-scarcity economics & energy as a human right,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2016, 10:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pioneers-for
-change/from-the-starspost-scarci_b_11874550.html [https://perma.cc/VE3M-6E2J].
126 Id.
127 Andre Schaffrin & Nadine Reibling, Household Energy and Climate Mitigation Policies:
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from a social equity standpoint, improving the efficiency of a swimming pool
does not equate to improving the efficiency of a low-income heating and
cooling system. Consequently, a given amount of energy can produce very
different levels of comfort, health and safety. Schaffrin and Reibling
conclude that given the disparities in the housing stock and urban infra-
structure, “low-income households need more energy to produce a similar
level of comfort. As a result, if we take differences in need factors (e.g.,
time spent at home, building conditions) into account, inequalities may be
even larger than a mere descriptive comparison of energy use between
income groups might suggest.”128 The result, again, is that the current
energy efficiency system, which relies on purely quantitative calculations
of emissions reductions (and costs), excluding social costs and benefits
actually reinforces and promotes inequality.
From an EJ perspective, the current energy efficiency delivery infra-
structure presents a contradiction. On the one hand, low-income energy
efficiency offers real and viable opportunities to realize multiple social,
economic, and health co-benefits—that is, energy efficiency can result in
health and economic improvements for families, as well as community
revitalization in EJ communities. On the other hand, the existing energy
efficiency delivery infrastructure and the costs associated with how low-
income programs are delivered result in dis-incentivizing energy effi-
ciency in low-income communities.
A. Household Versus Community-Oriented Energy Efficiency
Very little research has focused on the issue of energy services using
the community as the planning unit. Nearly all research and policy analy-
ses on energy efficiency and energy issues have focused on the individual
household and sector level (residential, industrial, commercial, etc.).129
While this is important, it neglects the reality of EJ community experi-
ences. The foundation of the EJ framework is built on the fact that the
health and well-being of community members is the result of the full set of
cumulative risks, stressors, and assets that are present in their communi-
ties.130 The problem is that Native, communities of color, and low-income
Investigating Energy Practices in the Housing Sector, 77 ENERGY POL’Y 1, 2 (2015), http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421514006673 [https://perma.cc/KCG8
-BHPN].
128 Id.
129 Hoffman et al., supra note 107, at 2.
130 Colleen Callahan et. al., Pathways to Environmental Justice: Advancing a Framework for
Evaluation, LUSKIN CTR. FOR INNOVATION 22 (2012), http://luskin.ucla.edu/sites/default
/files/Pathways%20to%20Environmental%20Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXL7-JR3D].
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communities have experienced higher pollution risks and burdens, and
simultaneously are unable to access sustainability or green investments
compared to their middle and upper income counterparts.131 Moreover,
when low-income communities are targeted for such investments, poten-
tial displacement from gentrification presents a critical problem.132
Sustainable energy planning has, for the most part, lacked a place-
based strategy. Yet, in reality there are a wide range of place-based inter-
actions that make up daily energy consumption: schools, businesses, public
buildings, libraries, community buildings, and other supportive service
buildings.133 All of these make up the infrastructure of a community, and
collectively have an impact on residents’ quality of life.
Ironically, place-based energy efficiency programs that target middle
and upper income neighborhoods and communities have been an inten-
tional strategy by energy service companies.134 However, a comprehensive
assessment of energy services for EJ neighborhoods has not entered into
the energy efficiency agenda. EJ communities have a history of capital
disinvestment both in the private housing stock and in the community
building infrastructure. Yet, programs targeting small and minority-owned
businesses, schools, and community buildings in EJ communities only mar-
ginally exist.135 The closest the energy sector has come is in prioritizing
the MUSH sector (municipalities, universities, schools, hospitals) for
investment.136 However, the rationale for targeting MUSH is due to the
fact that these institutions represent very large energy consumers, and
131 Jasmine Bell, 5 Things to Know About Communities of Color and Environmental Justice,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 25, 2016, 9:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/is
sues/race/news/2016/04/25/136361/5-things-to-know-about-communities-of-color-and
-environmental-justice/ [https://perma.cc/R3YX-M9M6].
132 H. Spencer Banzhaf & Eleanor McCormick, Moving Beyond Cleanup: Identifying the
Crucibles of Environmental Gentrification, EPA 2 (Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Econ., Working
Paper No. 07-02, 2007), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents
/moving_beyond_cleanup_identifying_the_crucibles_of_environmental_gentrification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3XCN-M4QK].
133 Commercial Buildings Energy Consumption Survey (CBECS), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(2016), https://www.eia.gov/consumption/commercial/building-type-definitions.php.
134 In conversation with the director of an energy services provider in Minneapolis, MN
and CEED staff, he stated that low-income neighborhoods were not a priority for effi-
ciency services. Instead, middle and upper income households were encouraged to organize
by residential blocks to more efficiently and cost-effectively provide energy efficiency
services by the program administrator.
135 Investing in Minority Banks, ENERGY.GOV (2016), https://energy.gov/diversity/services
/investing-minority-banks [https://perma.cc/74SC-YVT2].
136 William Pentland, Energy Services Sector Sustained by “MUSH” Markets, FORBES
(Jan. 12, 2011, 8:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/01/12/energy
-services-sustained-by-mush-market/#66754c512df1 [https://perma.cc/A3RQ-APX8].
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therefore energy efficiency services can result in larger savings.137 Equity
and justice criteria are equally marginalized in MUSH programs, if they
are incorporated at all.138
This is a critical shortcoming in energy efficiency service delivery,
and is reinforced by the methodologies used for research and data collec-
tion in energy and energy efficiency planning and analysis.
B. Low-Income Energy Programs Dominated by Rate-Payer
Assistance
There are two types of programs that currently serve low-income
communities, weatherization (which includes services that reduce energy
consumption from electricity, natural gas and other energy sources (e.g.,
energy efficiency)), and ratepayer assistance programs.139 Funding for
these programs is available from a variety of public and private sources.140
At the federal level, the two major programs are the Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (“LIHEAP”) and the Weatherization Assis-
tance Program (“WAP”).141 LIHEAP is a block grant program that provides
assistance to low-income households to meet their home energy costs and
for households in energy crises.142 LIHEAP also offers low-cost residen-
tial weatherization and energy-related home repairs (up to 15% or 25%
of the grant if a waiver is approved).143 According to the LIHEAP Clear-
inghouse, ratepayer assistance constitutes 80% of total resources for low-
income households, with energy efficiency constituting only 20%.144
WAP is a formula grant program to states for energy efficiency for
low-income households, administered by the Department of Energy.145
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 LOOKING BEYOND LIHEAP: ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY ASSISTANCE, NAT’L
COUNCIL ON AGING (2015), https://www.ncoa.org/wp-content/uploads/Alternative-Sources
-of-Energy-Assistance.pdf [https://perma.cc/278U-FVZN].
140 Id.
141 Joy Moses, Winter Weather and Low-Income Heating Assistance, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Sept. 15, 2008, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2008/09
/15/4893/winter-weather-and-low-income-heating-assistance/ [https://perma.cc/94ET-ZMD2].
142 LIHEAP CLEARINGHOUSE, LIHEAP 101: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (2014), https://liheap
ch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/LCIssueBriefs/FinalLIHEAPPrimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV69-ZM5L].
143 Id. at 6.
144 LIHEAP CLEARINGHOUSE, LEVERAGING AND LIHEAP: PROVIDING NON-FEDERAL FUNDS
FOR ENERGY ASSISTANCE (2015), https://liheapch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/LCIssueBriefs/leverag
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AHG-QMMF].
145 About the Weatherization Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://energy
.gov/eere/wipo/about-weatherization-assistance-program-0 [https://perma.cc/6UGG-98KX].
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While an important source of funding, LIHEAP actually exceeds WAP
funding, but both are vastly underfunded.146
Figure 2. Percentage of Eligible Households Served by LIHEAP147
According to the National Energy Assistance Directors Associa-
tion (“NEADA”), the number of households receiving energy assistance
declined by 17% between 2010 and 2013 as funding declined.148 At its
peak, LIHEAP served 21% of households federally eligible,149 but in ad-
dition to underfunding, when energy prices increase, the purchasing
power of LIHEAP assistance is compromised.150 This is what occurred
between 2010 and 2013, when purchasing power of the average LIHEAP
grant decreased.151
146 LIHEAP CLEARINGHOUSE, LIHEAP and WAP Funding, https://liheapch.acf.hhs.gov
/Funding/funding.htm [https://perma.cc/RG8T-AGEW] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
147 LIHEAP CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 144, at 2.
148 Serj Berelson, Myths of Low-Income Energy Efficiency Programs: Implications for
Outreach, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. 7–33 (2014), http://aceee.org
/files/proceedings/2014/data/papers/7-287.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C2D-JVFB].
149 Libby Perl, Cong. Research Serv., RL31865, LIHEAP: Program and Funding 6 (2013),
http://neada.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CRSLIHEAPProgramRL318651.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AX7U-GBCL].
150 Berelson, supra note 148, at 7-32 to -33.
151 CAMPAIGN FOR HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE, INVESTING IN LIHEAP: WHY ENERGY
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In addition to LIHEAP and WAP, a number of other federal pro-
grams include an energy services component: HUD housing programs,
the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”), and the Commu-
nity Services Block Grant (“CSBG”) are examples.152 State funding sources
include ratepayer funds (a surcharge on customers’ utility bills), state
general funds, and non-governmental support which includes private non-
profit and religious organizations.153
Although there are a great variety of energy efficiency programs
for all sectors, utilities continue to be the main supplier of energy effi-
ciency services. The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy
(“ACEEE”) reports that in 2014, utility-based electric energy efficiency,
which is largely funded through ratepayer charges, totaled $5.7 billion.154
Similarly, according to the Consortium on Energy Efficiency (“CEE”), an
industry association, when combining ratepayer and non-ratepayer sources
of funding, electric efficiency program budgets reached $6.7 billion in
2015.155 These ratepayer dollars comprised over 96% of funding for elec-
tric demand side management programs in the U.S.156
Figure 3 shows program budgets by category between 2010 to
2014. Residential programs constitute a little under one-third of energy
efficiency program budgets, and low-income program budgets were only
about 6% of total budgets, making it the lowest budgeted program.157
There are numerous reasons for this, including the fact that the indus-
trial and commercial sectors are large energy users, meaning they also
have a high energy reduction potential and are specifically targeted for
energy efficiency.158
ASSISTANCE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER 4 (2014), http://liheap.org/cms/assets/uploads
/2014/06/Investing_in_LIHEAP_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QAY-DQJ8].
152 ALANA LANDEY & YULIYA RZAD, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., APPROACHES
TO LOW-INCOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE FUNDING IN SELECTED STATES 3–4 (2014), https://
aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/approaches-low-income-energy-assistance-funding-selected
-states [https://perma.cc/3SFX-MSRU].
153 Id. at 2.
154 A. GILLEO ET. AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., THE 2015 STATE
ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCORECARD 22 (2015).
155 CONSORTIUM FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, 2015 STATE OF THE EFFICIENCY PROGRAM
INDUSTRY 28 (2016), https://library.cee1.org/system/files/library/12628/CEE_2015_Annual
_Industry_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JGH-HLJQ].
156 See id. at 25. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) comprised 1.69%, and
constituted 7% of the total funding reported in RGGI states in 2015.
157 Id. at 30.
158 Id. at 49.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Energy Efficiency Program Budgets by
Sector
Ratepayer assistance is, of course, an essential program in the context
of the energy affordability gap discussed earlier.159 The benefit of this
program is that households with the least income capacity receive sup-
port to ensure they can meet their basic energy needs. In addition, states
have various rules that limit disconnections for vulnerable families dur-
ing times of critical energy conditions (cold weather, very high heat days,
etc.).160 Even so, as noted earlier, current funding does not meet the
needs of the most income-vulnerable.161 A LIHEAP Clearinghouse report
states that LIHEAP supports approximately 20% of the households
eligible to receive energy assistance.162
The problem with these programs from an EJ perspective is that
the bulk of energy assistance is essentially assistance for direct utility
payments (nearly 76%), while approximately 24% are for programs to
reduce inefficient energy consumption in low-income households. Clearly,
Source: CEE, 2016
159 Adrienne L. Thompson, Protecting Low-Income Ratepayers as the Electricity System
Evolves, 2016 ENERGY BAR ASSOC. 267, 267–68 (2016).
160 Id. at 276–79.
161 Keturah A. Brown, Ensuring Energy for Low-Income Households of Color, JOINT CTR.
POL. & ECON. STUD., Feb. 2017, at 2, http://jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring%20
Energy%20for%20Low%20Income%20Households%20of%20Color%20.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3UGW-GWM4].
162 Id.
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a priority in federal policy is to ensure utility rate payments over improv-
ing the energy conditions of low-income households and communities.
When energy programs claim low-income benefits, it is critical to distin-
guish whether it is ratepayer assistance or actual energy improvements
in the household or community.
VII. RACE IS AN EJ ISSUE
Research on the issue of race-based disparities with respect to
energy production and consumption is an area that continues to be under-
developed. To the degree that equity and justice are addressed in energy
planning, the focus has been almost exclusively on income-based con-
cerns.163 Yet, there has been documentation in various EJ studies that
race is as significant a factor, and in some cases even more so.164 In an
evaluation of weatherization programs conducted by Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, it was found that roughly half of those who had their homes
weatherized are white; only 16% are Black; 5% are Latino; and less than
4% are American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian, or Native Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander (2008 data).165 Analyses on the racial distribution of energy costs
and benefits are only now emerging, and is an area in much need of fur-
ther research.
In the CPP, the CEIP provides modest incentives for energy ef-
ficiency in low-income communities, but does not address the problem or
potentiality of race-based disparities.166 The question that will bear ex-
amining is if the incentives provided by the CPP (or any other related
energy efficiency policy) actually result in greater energy efficiency
programs across communities, will they be equitably distributed across
race? In comments to the proposed rule, there were requests for equity
analyses on the potential distribution of both the benefits and costs of
163 Id.
164 See Michael Ash & T. Robert Fetter, Who Lives on the Wrong Side of the Environmental
Tracks? Evidence from the EPA’s Risk Screening Environmental Indicators Model, 85 SOC.
SCI. Q. 441, 441 (2004); Robert J. Brulle & David N. Pellow, Environmental Justice: Human
Health and Environmental Inequalities, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 103, 105 (2006); Lara
Cushing et al., The Haves, the Have-Nots, and the Health of Everyone: The Relationship
Between Social Inequality and Environmental Quality, 36 PUB. HEALTH 193, 201 (2015).
165 Based on available data. Data was not available for 22% of PY08 clients. INGO BENSCH
ET AL., OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., NATIONAL WEATHERIZATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CHARAC-
TERIZATION: DESCRIBING THE PRE-ARRA PROGRAM 84 (2014), http://info.ornl.gov/sites/pub
lications/files/Pub42684.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AGS-VKKF].
166 Clean Energy Incentive Program Design Details, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,969, 42,969 (pro-
posed June 30, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 62).
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CPP compliance—specifically, identifying energy efficiency and renew-
able energy as benefits.167 Without referencing or incentivizing equitable
delivery of energy efficiency services with respect to race, the potential
for exacerbating racial disparities through energy efficiency investments,
especially in segregated areas, becomes even more possible.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The environmental justice movement supports climate mitigation
policy, especially because these communities most immediately experi-
ence the impacts of climate change. Not only are EJ communities on the
frontline of climate change, but, also just as fundamentally from the EJ
perspective, there is a moral obligation to act in a manner that is respectful
to and does not violate the environment. This Paper is an effort to identify
important issues of concern with regard to employing energy efficiency
as a mitigation mechanism. The intent is not to discourage the use of en-
ergy efficiency. To the contrary, energy efficiency is critically important,
and, if designed and implemented with equity at the center, can be one
of the most effective climate strategies that achieves both environmental
and social sustainability. Herein lies the difficult, but not unsurmount-
able, challenge. To the extent that energy and climate policy maintains a
carbon reductionist orientation, the pathway to equitable energy effi-
ciency investment and a future based on both social and environmental
sustainability is undermined. In identifying equity concerns, the hope is
that a pathway for creating innovative and inclusive energy efficiency
policies and programs can be furthered.
As noted, the research and analysis with respect to equity and cli-
mate mitigation is quite limited when compared to other compliance con-
cerns. Moreover, most reports on the potential carbon reductions associated
with energy efficiency are based on a variety of assumptions. Evaluated,
monitored, and verified real reductions are another matter. Much of the
discussion and research about energy efficiency is related to the former, and
the implications of how energy efficiency programs operate on the ground
are relatively immature. To be clear, it is not that these analyses are, in
and of themselves, problematic. They do provide us with effective informa-
tion and data from which to evaluate mitigation alternatives. However,
they do not address the distributive (equity and justice) implementation
issues. As one of the complement of papers addressing environmental
167 Letter from Center for Earth Energy and Democracy to Gina McCarthy, Adminis-
trator, U.S. EPA (Dec. 1, 2014), at 3.
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justice sponsored by the Milan School,168 the goal of this Paper is to pro-
vide some normative (principled) and practice-based questions that climate
advocates and policy/regulatory actors should also consider.
Recommendations moving forward are:
• Improve “meaningful” participation and involvement
of EJ and other equity/justice community members
and organizations in energy planning. Historically,
equity/justice has not been included in energy plan-
ning. Public decision-making authorities such as
Public Utility Commissions, Public Service Commis-
sions, and state energy agencies, where important
decisions are made regarding energy planning,
have not been a priority for EJ participation. The
EJ community should be engaged in these pro-
cesses, and these authorities should include plans
for effective EJ community engagement.
• Develop community energy plans. Due to interest
and attention to renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency, there has been an increase in the number
of Energy Service Companies (“ESCOs”) and re-
newable energy service providers.169 This is a posi-
tive trend for a clean energy transition. However,
because EJ communities have largely not partici-
pated in energy planning processes, they are often
subject to a top-down planning approach. It is im-
portant that EJ communities be able to engage in
energy planning, and develop energy plans that meet
community energy needs. This can result in two
outcomes: 1) the appropriate mix of energy technol-
ogies (solar, wind, geothermal, energy efficiency,
etc.) are matched with community needs (which vary
according to locality, climate, energy use, rural vs.
168 Rebecca Fuger, Visiting Scholars Release White Papers on Environmental Justice Impli-
cations of U.S. EPA’s Clean Power Plan, THE NEW SCHOOL (July 11, 2016), http://blogs
.newschool.edu/tedc/2016/07/11/cpp_ej/ [https://perma.cc/ZT5C-R5P5].
169 Andy Frank, ESCOs and Utilities: Shaping the Future of the Energy Efficiency Business,
GREENBIZ (Apr. 13, 2008, 5:00 PM), https://www.greenbiz.com/news/2008/04/13/escos-and
-utilities-shaping-future-energy-efficiency-business.
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urban, industrial/commercial/residential mix, etc.);
and 2) the process of energy planning inherently in-
tersects with other community planning concerns,
including but not limited to housing, transporta-
tion, pollution reduction, food access, green spaces,
and other community infrastructure development.
• Address racial concerns and disparities. The role of
the energy sector in either promoting or reducing
racial disparities has yet to be addressed. In many
respects, the energy sector today is where the
housing and education sectors were in the 1950s
with regard to assessing racial issues. The EJ com-
munity has consistently demanded relief and rem-
edy for any disproportionate pollution burdens that
have occurred. Given that the energy sector is a
substantial source of various pollutants, it is essen-
tial that energy alternatives are reviewed with
respect to their impacts on Native communities,
communities of color, and low-income communities.
• Utility programs should be required to adopt types
of assessment that include benefits such as pollu-
tion reduction, health benefits, equity enhancement
(i.e., reduction in energy disparities), etc. This is
one step toward institutionalizing a process for
assessing future energy alternatives that includes
benefits beyond the sole use of carbon reductions.
Many states use a social cost methodology; how-
ever, it is important to include equity impacts in
the social cost calculation. Non-energy benefits are
a social issue that ought to be addressed through-
out the energy planning system.
• Energy efficiency and weatherization resources
should, at minimum, match ratepayer assistance.
As noted, ratepayer assistance receives three-quar-
ters of federal low-income resources, and yet meets
only a fraction of the need.170 The root cause of the
problem is an inefficient household infrastructure.
While ratepayer assistance is indeed necessary
170 Woolf et al., supra note 53; Chandler, supra note 53.
640 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:605
(and it should in no way be construed that we are
suggesting decreases in these programs), it does not
address the underlying problem. As states develop
energy efficiency as a climate mitigation strategy
and report on low-income benefits, energy efficiency
should have at least the same level of investment
as existing rate-payer assistance programs.
• Energy efficiency incentives should be divorced from
carbon trading. At this time there is insufficient
research and analysis on the distributive (equity and
justice) impacts of carbon trading. Carbon market-
based incentives are solely based on carbon reduc-
tions. The implications are that EJ communities
could simultaneously receive energy efficiency (and
renewable energy) investments while experiencing
no pollution reductions, and potentially increases
in emissions. In addition, the interdependent struc-
ture of the electric system means that reductions
due to energy efficiency have no impact on power
plants in EJ communities. These outcomes are at
cross-purposes.
• The level of incentive should match the actual costs
of energy efficiency program implementation in low-
income communities. As noted, recent analysis on
the total program costs for providing low-income
energy efficiency programs is seven times that of the
residential sector as a whole. The two-to-one match
provided by EPA in the CEIP is inadequate to fully
incentivize the program costs. The effects of this
remain to be seen, but, at minimum, an analysis of
the incentive required to reduce the marginal costs
to achieve the desired level of low-income energy
efficiency implementation should be conducted. Be-
yond the CPP and the CEIP, appropriate incentives
for addressing inequity in energy efficiency need to
be developed.
• The CEIP low-income section should not be diluted
under the name of state flexibility to include sector
wide benefits, which may not directly improve the
condition of low-income communities. The proposed
CEIP released on June 16, 2016 proposed that
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renewable energy be included within the low-income
allocation. In order to increase equity resources, re-
newable energy for low-income communities should
fall under the renewable energy allocation, which
would essentially amount to a low-income carve out.
Moreover, by including transmission and distribu-
tion projects that reduce electricity use on the cus-
tomer side of the meter, general infrastructure
improvements that benefit all customers can be
included in the low-income allocation (presumably
by simply determining the low-income proportion
of customers). This violates the principle of promot-
ing equity/justice specific investment.
• Increase equity-based research and analysis. Be-
cause there is a dearth of research on equity/justice
in the energy sector, it is important to address this
void. In order to reduce speculative research efforts,
building the capacity of the EJ community to identify
and support research is critical. Such community-
based research has proved to be effective in the
public health arena. This would avoid equity re-
search that is purely funder-driven and motivated,
and instead build the capacity of communities and
researchers that are skilled in these issues.
